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Abstract 
Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) present with deficits in social communication and 
social interaction, as well as restricted and repetitive behaviors, interests, and activities. Theory 
of Mind (ToM) has been identified as a key factor in social development in both typically 
developing (TD) children and children with ASD. One proposed explanation for the deficits in 
social development characteristic in ASD is that deficits in ToM, particularly the ability to infer 
the mental states of self and others, results in impairments in social development. Researchers 
have found that affect recognition is a precursor in the development of ToM which occurs during 
early childhood. Researchers have also begun exploring parental factors that may influence 
affect recognition abilities in TD children and children with ASD. The current study sought to 
explore the moderating role of parent emotion coaching on the mediating role of affect 
recognition abilities on ToM in TD and children with ASD. The sample included 17 children 
ages 3:3 to 6:11 and one of their parents. ToM was measured using a battery of diverse belief 
and false belief tasks. Affect recognition was measured using the affect recognition subtest of A 
Developmental Neuropsychological Assessment (Korkman, Kirk & Kemp, 2007). Parent meta-
emotion coaching was assessed with a semi-structured meta-emotion interview with the parent 
(Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1996). Results from main analyses did not find significant relations 
between developmental status and parent meta-emotion, affect recognition abilities, or theory of 
mind abilities. The moderated mediation model was not supported. Results from ancillary 
analyses indicated a majority of parents identified their child’s characteristics influenced their 
meta-emotion philosophies. However, parents of children with ASD were more likely to identify 
that their child’s characteristics made emotion socialization more difficult. Results indicated 
affect recognition abilities were positively related to age. Parents’ meta-emotion philosophies 
about their child’s regulation of emotions were negatively related to children’s overall affect 
recognition errors. Parent’s meta-emotion philosophies about their child’s regulation of sadness 
was also negatively related to child sadness recognition errors. Consistent with previous 
research, results demonstrated a trend of increasing difficulty through the battery of ToM tasks. 
 
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder; theory of mind; affect recognition; parent meta-emotion  
THEORY OF MIND IN CHILDREN WITH ASD 7 
 
 Chapter I 
Introduction and Chapter Review 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by 
persistent deficits in social interactions and social communication as well as restricted, repetitive 
patterns of behavior, interests, or activities (American Psychiatric Association; APA, 2013). 
Research in the domain of ASD is critical given that its prevalence has risen from 1 in 150 
children in 2000 to 1 in 54 in 2016 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). 
Compared to the general population, individuals with ASD have a higher risk of developing co-
morbid mental health disorders including anxiety, depression, and attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (McCauley et al., 2020; Stringer et al., 2020). Individuals with ASD also have worse 
outcomes in friendships and romantic relationships compared to the general population, 
including difficulties initiating and maintaining friendships, having less interest in friendships, 
and shorter duration of friendships (Hancock et al., 2019; Jamil et al., 2017). ASD has a 
significant behavioral, social, emotional and economic impact on families (Karst & Vaughan 
Van Hecke, 2012). In addition to the impact of ASD on families, there is also a high societal cost 
of caring for children with ASD (Lavelle et al., 2014). 
Social communication and interaction are integral components of social cognition. 
Theory of Mind (ToM) has been identified as an important function in social-cognitive 
development in both typically developing children and children with ASD (Kimhi et al., 2014). 
Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985) first proposed the ToM hypothesis to explain a key 
mechanism in the presentation of impaired social communication and interaction characteristic 
of ASD. The ToM hypothesis states that the social difficulties present in ASD may result from 
the inability to attribute mental states to self and others. These mental states include beliefs, 
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desires, intentions, imagination, and emotions. Many studies on ToM indicate that children with 
ASD demonstrate deficits in performance on these tasks compared to TD children (Pellicano, 
2010). This research provides evidence that mastery of basic ToM tasks occurs in TD children at 
approximately age four or five years of age (Wellman et al., 2001). Previous research suggests 
that many factors influence the development of ToM. 
Researchers have suggested that emotion perception ability is a key precursor to the 
development of ToM (Mitchell & Phillips, 2015). Adults and school-aged children with ASD 
demonstrate facial emotion recognition difficulties in comparison to their TD peers (Eack et al., 
2015; Evers et al., 2015; Hudepohl et al., 2015). In addition, compared to TD peers, children 
with ASD who perform more poorly on a facial emotion recognition task performed more poorly 
on ToM tasks (Heerey, Keltner, & Capps, 2003; Trevisan & Birmingham, 2016). However, little 
research has been directed at identifying potential parent contextual factors that influence 
emotion recognition in children (Castro et al., 2015). A large body of research consistently 
demonstrates the relation between parent meta-emotion philosophy and emotion regulation in 
both TD children and children with ASD (Haven et al., 2014; Hooven et al., 1995; Wilson et al., 
2014). One study suggested that meta-emotion philosophies (i.e., beliefs and values about 
emotions) of parents predicted their TD school aged child’s performance on an emotion 
recognition task (Castro et al., 2015).   
In this study, I expanded on the body of literature examining factors in the development 
of ToM in children with ASD by investigating the roles of affect recognition and parent meta-
emotion philosophy in preschool aged children with ASD and TD children. The findings from 
this study contributes to identifying novel areas of parent intervention to enhance the 
development of ToM in children with ASD.  
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Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Overview 
 ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder that persists throughout the lifespan and is 
characterized by deficits in social communication and social interaction in addition to restricted 
or repetitive patterns of behaviors, interests, or activities (APA, 2013). Deficits in social 
communication are evidenced by deficits in social reciprocity; nonverbal communication; and 
developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships (APA, 2013). Restricted, repetitive 
patterns of behaviors, interests, or activities include stereotypies or repetitive motor behaviors, 
insistence on sameness and inflexibility of routines, abnormally intense and highly restricted 
interests, and unusual sensory interest or aversion to environmental stimuli (APA, 2013).  
Individuals with ASD vary widely in the degree of severity of these symptoms, intellectual 
abilities, and in their functional outcomes across the lifespan (Baio et al., 2018; Lane et al., 2010; 
Szatmari et al., 2015). 
   Based on the highly heterogeneous nature of ASD, the severity of symptoms related to 
social communication and restricted, repetitive behaviors in ASD are specified according the 
degree of support required for daily functioning (APA, 2013). The term “ASD” encompasses 
previous categorical diagnoses of autistic disorder, Asperger’s disorder, and pervasive 
developmental disorder-not otherwise specified. Researchers have provided evidence that the 
aforementioned categorical diagnoses are better represented by a behaviorally defined continuum 
of impairments within the domains of social communication and interaction, and restricted, 
repetitive patterns of behaviors, interests, or activities causing clinically significant impairments 
in adaptive functioning (Bölte et al., 2011). Accurately identifying the symptom criteria of ASD 
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is critical in developing measures that are appropriately sensitive and specific (Frazier et al., 
2011).   
Prevalence 
 Obtaining accurate prevalence estimates is important to improve early identification and 
diagnosis of ASD. Early identification and diagnosis inform policies to optimize health spending 
on intervention resources for individuals with ASD (Frazier et al., 2011).  The prevalence of 
ASD in the United States has risen sharply from 1 in 150 since 2010 (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2018). The latest prevalence estimate of ASD in the United States was 
18.5 per 1000 (1 in 54) children aged 8 years in 2016 (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2018). There are several potential factors contributing to the increased prevalence 
rate including, changes in diagnostic criteria, improved detection and access to diagnostic 
services, and an actual increase in the frequency of ASD (APA, 2013). Data demonstrated that 
the prevalence rate of ASD in males is four times greater than in females (at 26.6 per 1000 boys 
vs. 6.6 per 1000 girls; Baio et al., 2018). However, researchers suggested that this disparity in 
prevalence between males and females is overstated due to the later age of diagnosis, under 
detection, and differing pattern of symptom presentation in females (Baio et al., 2018; Begeer et 
al., 2013; Mandy et al., 2012; Rutherford et al., 2016). 
Etiology  
The body of research examining the etiology of ASD suggests that there is no single clear 
cause for ASD. Instead, there is data to support the existence of numerous contributing risk 
factors. Some risk factors relate to environmental considerations whereas others relate to genetic 
contributions. Additionally, the interaction of environmental risk factors and genetic 
vulnerabilities may also contribute to risk of developing ASD (Modabbernia et al., 2017). There 
THEORY OF MIND IN CHILDREN WITH ASD 11 
 
are a number of environmental risk factors that contribute to the risk of developing ASD 
(Gardener et al., 2011). Research suggests that during the first trimester of pregnancy, prenatal 
exposure to valproate, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, and thalidomide significantly 
increases the risk of ASD (Christensen et al., 2013; Kobayashi et al., 2016; Strömland et al., 
1994). Another well documented risk factor in ASD risk in children is advanced biological 
parent age (Wu et al., 2017). Recently, researchers have also documented an increased risk of 
ASD with increasingly disparately aged biological parents (Sandin et al., 2016). 
In addition to environmental contributions, there are a number of genetic contributions to 
ASD. In 10-20% of ASD cases, genetic risk contributions include genetic syndromes, 
chromosomal deletions, chromosomal additions, and de novo copy number variations (Abrahams 
& Geschwind, 2008). This suggests that the etiology of ASD may be polygenic in nature 
(Gaugler et al., 2014; Risch et al., 1999). Despite the potential polygenic etiology of ASD, it 
remains one of the most genetically heritable neurodevelopmental disorders (Hallmayer et al., 
2011). A meta-analysis examining ASD twin studies reveals heritability estimates ranging from 
64-91% (Tick et al., 2015). Due to the diverse range of contributing risk factors to the etiology of 
ASD, it is critical to understand the resulting developmental courses and diverse range of 
functional implications in ASD.  
Developmental Course 
Differences in social attention, communication, and other social symptoms emerge as 
early as 6 months of age in children who are eventually diagnosed with ASD (Chawarska et al., 
2013; Kozlowski et al., 2011). Eighty-five percent of parents and caregivers of children with 
ASD first reported concerns by age 36 months (Baio et al., 2018; Herlihy et al., 2015). However, 
less than half of these children had received a comprehensive ASD evaluation by 36 months 
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(Baio et al., 2018). Despite the early onset of social differences and the availability of accurate 
and reliable measures for early diagnosis of ASD at 24 months of age, the average age of 
diagnosis is at 52 months of age (Baio et al., 2018; Chawarska et al., 2013; Macari et al., 2012). 
Early diagnosis is critical for access to early intervention to promote greater skill acquisition and 
reduced future functional impairment (Bradshaw et al., 2015). Children with ASD in the United 
States often access special education services such as speech/language therapy and occupational 
therapy throughout preschool, elementary, and secondary school (Wei et al., 2013). Across all 
ranges of intellectual functioning, individuals with ASD experience an initial increase in 
adaptive skills during early childhood, which is then followed by a plateau in adolescence 
(Meyer et al., 2018). Learning adaptive skills is critical given that individuals with ASD have the 
lowest rates of employment compared to individuals in other disability categories and that a 
minority of individuals with ASD achieve independent living (Shattuck et al., 2012; Steinhausen 
et al., 2016) 
Theory of Mind 
Overview 
Researchers have identified theory of mind as a key normative function in social-
cognitive development in TD children and children with ASD (Kimhi et al., 2014). Theory of 
mind was a term first coined by Premack and Woodruff (1978) to describe the theoretical 
construct regarding one’s ability to impute mental states to oneself and to others.  These mental 
states include beliefs, feelings, intentions, and goals (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Findings from 
studies indicate that children with ASD often demonstrate deficits in performance on theory of 
mind tasks compared to TD children (Pellicano, 2010). Researchers have provided evidence that 
typically developing children begin developing theory of mind at around 18 months of age and 
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attain theory of mind around 3 to 5 years of age (Korkmaz, 2011). Based on these findings, 
researchers have hypothesized that theory of mind may be the primary underlying cause of social 
impairments in ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Additionally, ToM appears to be an important 
predictor of a number of developmental outcomes in both TD children and children with ASD 
including social withdrawal, peer popularity, and peer rejection (Selcuk et al., 2018; Slaughter et 
al., 2015). 
Development of ToM in TD Children 
Longitudinal research demonstrates that precursors to demonstrating ToM on explicit 
tasks develop during infancy as early as 15 months through 48 months (Thoermer et al., 2011). 
These precursors demonstrate implicit understanding through anticipatory looking behaviors 
which suggests ToM develops in a continual manner (Thoermer et al., 2011). Findings from 
previous research suggest that preschool and early childhood (i.e., the first five years of life) are 
key developmental periods for ToM abilities (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). The development of 
ToM appears to be predictable for TD children. By three years of age, children can identify that 
others have desires, beliefs and understandings that may differ from their own (i.e., diverse 
desires, diverse true beliefs) but do not comprehend that others may have false beliefs and 
understandings that differ from their own (i.e., diverse false beliefs; Perner et al., 1987; Wellman 
et al., 2001). Children can comprehend that others may have false differing beliefs and 
understandings from their own at four years of age and begin to anticipate actions based on these 
beliefs and understandings (Wiesmann et al., 2017). Further development of ToM occurs by age 
5-6 such that children can understand that others may display emotions different from their own 
(Duh et al., 2016; Harris et al., 1989). 
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Previous research asserted that ToM abilities were fully developed in preschool/early 
childhood, however, emerging research is beginning to demonstrate that ToM abilities continue 
to develop throughout middle childhood and beyond (Weimer et al., 2017). In one study with a 
sample of 76 TD children age 6 to 8 ToM tasks, the researchers found a continued progression of 
ToM performance with increasing age when controlling for verbal ability (Calero et al., 2013). 
Another study also supports the argument for continued development of ToM beyond preschool. 
Researchers conducted a study with 230 children between the ages of 8 and 13 years and found 
that ToM scores increased significantly with age, while controlling for verbal ability and family 
socioeconomic status (Devine & Hughes, 2012).  
Previous studies also provided evidence of a relation between development of ToM and 
executive functions (Duh et al., 2016; Kimhi et al., 2014; Pellicano, 2010). Executive functions 
refer to the higher order cognitive functions which contribute towards the development of goal 
directed behaviors (Kimhi et al., 2014). The planning and cognitive shifting components of 
executive functions have been found to positively predict ToM performance in both TD children 
and children with ASD (Kimhi et al., 2014). Longitudinal research provided evidence that 
executive function predicts ToM performance during the period from 4 to 7 years of age but not 
during early and middle childhood (Pellicano, 2010; Devine et al., 2016). This highlights the 
importance of investigating ToM during the preschool years. 
The development of ToM abilities has critical implications on the development of social 
competence, emotion regulation abilities, and social adaptive functioning in early childhood 
goals (Korucu et al., 2017). A longitudinal study with a sample of 137 participants found 
moderate positive correlations between ToM performance at age 6 and teacher ratings of social 
competence at age 10 (Devine et al., 2016). The researchers also found that earlier false belief 
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ToM tasks that required children to identify their own and others’ false beliefs at age 6 predicted 
performance on more complex batteries of ToM tasks at age 10 (Devine et al., 2016) 
In addition to predicting critical emotion regulation abilities in early childhood, ToM also 
appears to predict more complex social behaviors. In a meta-analytic study comprised of 76 
studies and 6,432 TD children between ages 2 to 12 years, researchers found that children with 
higher ToM scores received higher scores on measures of prosocial behaviors (Imuta et al., 
2016). These higher order social behaviors included helping, cooperating, and comforting (Imuta 
et al., 2016). 
Development of ToM in Children with ASD 
 Compared to their TD peers, children with ASD demonstrate poorer performance on 
ToM measures and poorer teacher reported social competence in peer interaction (Peterson et al., 
2015). Even when intellectual abilities are statistically controlled for, preschool aged TD 
children outperform children with ASD in both false belief tasks and affective perspective taking 
tasks that assess for ToM (Kimhi et al., 2014). Researchers found support for a mediating role of 
ToM in the relation between ASD and social skills deficits in 107 children between the ages of 5 
and 13 years of age (Pino et al., 2017). Pino and colleagues (2017) found that children with ASD 
demonstrated a deficit in both social skills and ToM. Although findings from previous research 
suggest a strong relation between ToM and executive function skills (Duh et al., 2016; Kimhi et 
al., 2014; Pellicano, 2010), more recent research suggests that for adolescents with ASD, ToM 
abilities, but not executive function skills were directly related to social communication 
symptoms and restricted, repetitive behaviors characteristic of ASD (Jones et al., 2018). Given 
the high co-morbidity of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and ASD, Lukito and colleagues 
(2017) clarified the relations amongst executive function abilities and ToM performance in 
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adolescents with ADHD. Lukito and colleagues (2017) found that impairments in ToM abilities 
were associated with ASD symptoms, whereas executive function abilities were associated with 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder symptoms even after controlling for intelligence quotient. 
These findings support the ToM hypothesis of ASD that, deficits in ToM uniquely predict the 
social communication and interaction difficulties in ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Research 
examining the developmental progression of ToM performance with TD children and children 
with ASD provides evidence that children with ASD experience delayed onset in developing 
ToM abilities and also develop ToM abilities at a slower rate than children with TD (Pino et al., 
2017). 
Additional Factors in ToM 
Researchers have found evidence for numerous other factors that influence the 
development of ToM. These factors will be discussed here to provide rationale for statistically 
controlling for those factors. Key factors of gender, language, and executive function in ToM 
abilities will be discussed here. 
Gender differences in ToM performance appear to be persistent across childhood. One 
study examined ToM in TD children aged 6 to 8 years using old a battery of ToM tasks (Calero, 
et al., 2013). The researchers found that females across the 6 to 8 age range demonstrated 
significantly better performance on ToM tasks than males (Calero et al., 2013). Evidence has 
also been provided regarding gender differences in ToM at the neurological level. The medial 
prefrontal cortex has been implicated in serving a role in social cognition, particularly ToM (Van 
Overwalle, 2009). Researchers demonstrated that females demonstrate superior performance to 
males using transcranial brain stimulation techniques of the medial prefrontal cortex in a sample 
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of 32 participants (Adenzato et al., 2017). These findings suggest that gender is a variable that 
should be statistically controlled for in the analyses of the current study. 
Language ability has been identified as a key factor in predicting theory of mind in both 
TD children and children with ASD (Milligan et al., 2007). One meta-analysis based on 104 
studies has found moderate to large effect sizes of language on theory of mind ability for TD 
children, even when controlling for age. In addition, based on longitudinal studies, it appears that 
early language ability in TD children is a precursor to theory of mind and predicts theory of mind 
ability in later years (Astington & Jenkins, 1999). Astington and Jenkins (1999) asserted that 
language and theory of mind may even be fundamentally related and interdependent. 
 Similar findings have been demonstrated in samples of children with ASD. Paynter and 
Peterson (2010) examined the influence of language ability, specifically lexical and syntactic 
ability, on ToM in children ages 5 to 12 with high functioning ASD or Asperger syndrome 
compared to their age matched TD peers. The researchers assessed these variables using several 
false belief tasks, a vocabulary test, and a test for receptive grammar. Findings revealed that 
children with high functioning ASD performed more poorly on the theory of mind tasks 
compared to their TD peers and peers with Asperger syndrome (Paynter & Peterson, 2010). 
Furthermore, evidence was found that syntactic ability was more positively related to theory of 
mind for children with high functioning ASD than lexical ability in language. 
 Scheeren and colleagues (2013) also identified convergent findings. This study compared 
theory of mind performance between school aged TD children and children with high 
functioning ASD (Scheeren et al., 2013). Scheeren and colleagues (2013) used several different 
theory of mind measures including a false belief, display rule understanding and a sarcasm 
understanding task and a vocabulary test to assess for language ability. When controlling for age, 
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it was found that theory of mind was positively related to language ability.  This was expected 
given the highly verbal nature of the theory of mind tasks (tasks involved answering questions 
based on complex written vignettes). These findings suggest that language should be a variable 
that is controlled for in the current study. 
Assessing Theory of Mind 
There is a great deal of diversity in methods of theory of mind assessment in terms of 
task complexity as well as the nature of tasks (i.e., explicit versus implicit assessment). In 
addition to issues with the lack of clarity around using explicit versus implicit measures of theory 
of mind, the false belief task has also been under heavy criticism in the realm of social 
psychology (Bloom & German, 2000). Previous research has provided evidence that individuals 
with ASD may acquire explicit social cognition skills or knowledge through learning and 
experience but nonetheless demonstrate deficits in implicit social cognition. This allows 
adolescents with ASD to perform comparably to their TD peers on explicit social cognition tasks 
but not implicit social cognition tasks (Callenmark et al., 2014). Tests of ToM may be 
categorized into explicit or implicit tasks (Low & Perner, 2012). Most classical measures of ToM 
involve direct explicit measurement of ToM (Low & Perner 2012). 
Callenmark et al. (2014) compared adolescents with ASD to TD their peers, matched on 
sex, age, and vocabulary, on explicit and implicit performance on a social cognition task. 
Explicit and implicit social cognition performance was assessed with the Dewey Story Test. 
Callenmark et al. (2014) found that with regards to the explicit component of the task, 
adolescents with ASD performed comparably to the TD adolescents. However, adolescents with 
ASD performed more poorly than their TD peers on the implicit component of the task. These 
findings suggest that different tasks may assess different aspects of social cognition which may 
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influence either the absence or presence of deficits in social cognition characteristic of ASD. The 
study by Callenmark et al. (2014) did not directly address performance on explicit and implicit 
ToM tasks within the domain of social cognition. A study by Begeer et al. (2011) provided 
evidence supporting differential explicit versus implicit ToM abilities of children with ASD. 
Begeer et al. (2011) empirically evaluated a manualized ToM skills training treatment applied to 
pre-adolescent children with ASD. Supporting the suggestion that individuals with ASD can 
acquire social cognition skills through learning and experience, an improvement on explicit ToM 
skills related to reasoning about one’s own and others’ mental states was demonstrated. 
However, Begeer et al. (2011) did not find any significant improvements on skills indicative of 
implicit ToM such as emotion perception, emotion recognition, self-reported empathic skills and 
parent reported social behavior. These findings highlight the importance of considering the 
nature of ToM tasks when evaluating the performance of children with ASD. This also suggests 
that there may be a learning gap for individuals with ASD in transitioning between explicit ToM 
skills in early childhood and developing implicit ToM skills in adolescence and beyond. This is 
critical in navigating an increasingly complex and demanding social environment as individuals 
with ASD age. 
Affect Recognition and ToM 
 Affect recognition refers to the ability to identify information about emotions from the 
environment (Phillips, 2003). This information may include verbal (e.g., words, intonation) and 
non-verbal (i.e., facial, body movement) cues. Affect recognition has been described as a 
cognitive process that is a precursor to ToM in models of social information processing (Beer & 
Ochsner, 2006; Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, 2006). Affect recognition is conceptualized as a 
low-level process that attends to and decodes social cues from the environment, whereas ToM is 
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a higher-level process in which the social cues are integrated and interpreted (Chakrabarti & 
Cohen, 2006). Individuals with ASD demonstrate significantly poorer performance on tasks of 
affect recognition across all six primary emotions (i.e., fear, surprise, anger, disgust, happiness, 
and sadness) than TD individuals over the course of development (Lozier et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, these deficits in performance appear to increase in magnitude over the course of 
development (Lozier et al., 2014). During the psychological assessment and diagnosis of ASD, 
both low level static (i.e., measures of affect recognition) and higher level socially dynamic 
social information processing measures are used (i.e., measures of ToM). Affect recognition may 
serve as an important mechanism through which ToM deficits in ASD produce social 
communication and interaction deficits. 
Parent Factors in Affect Recognition 
 Affect recognition skills are part of a complex process of socialization of emotions.  
Parents are a primary agent for TD children’s socialization. The way in which parents react to 
their TD children’s emotions acts as a strong method of socializing their emotional knowledge 
and beliefs (Eisenberg et al., 1998). Researchers also found that in addition to parents’ reactions 
to their children’s emotions, parents’ reactions and thoughts also influence children’s emotion 
socialization. In research, the term meta-emotion is used to describe parents’ cognitions and 
feelings regarding their own affect and their child’s affect (Gottman et al., 1996).  
In a study with 69 parent child dyads with children between the ages of 8 and 11, parents’ 
beliefs about children’s emotions and children’s affect recognition skills were assessed. Parent’s 
beliefs were assessed using a self-report questionnaire and observations during a game designed 
to elicit emotion-related conversation. Children’s affect recognition skills were also assessed 
through evaluating the accuracy of identifying their parents’ emotions in a video (Castro et al., 
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2015). Parent’s beliefs and behaviors regarding children’s emotions positively predicted 
children’s affect recognition abilities in this study. Parent beliefs about emotions have also been 
demonstrated to influence more complex forms of emotion understanding in school-aged 
children including contextually changing emotions of self and others in vignettes that elicit 
emotional responses (Garrett-Peters et al., 2016). Previous research has compared meta-emotion 
in parents of TD children and parents of children with developmental disabilities (Paterson et al., 
2012). The findings from this research find that parents of children with developmental 
disabilities differ from parents of TD children in that they uniquely experienced a dimension 
regarding feelings of uncertainty or ineffectiveness in emotion socialization of their children. 
This provides a basis to begin examining potentially novel pathways to interventions that 
enhance ToM and through this, social interaction and communication skills. 
Current Study 
In the current study, I proposed there would be an indirect effect of developmental status 
on ToM through affect recognition as moderated by parent meta-emotion (see Figure 1). I 
hypothesized that children with ASD will have worse affect recognition abilities than TD 
children (Hypothesis 1). Children with ASD are also hypothesized to have worse ToM skills 
compared to TD children (Hypothesis 2). I hypothesized that the relationship between status and 
affect recognition will depend on the level of parent meta-emotion. Higher meta-emotion scores 
will buffer the effect of developmental status on affect recognition performance (Hypothesis 3). 
An indirect effect of status on ToM will exist through affect recognition. I hypothesized that 
having ASD will predict worse ToM performance through worse affect recognition performance 
(Hypothesis 4). Lastly, I hypothesized an indirect effect of developmental status on ToM 
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performance through affect recognition performance as moderated by parent meta-emotion 
(Hypothesis 5). 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model of the current study. 
  
Theory of Mind 
Status 









 The current study was conducted as part of a larger on-going study (Study of Autism and 
Self-Regulation). Children between 3:0 years and 6:11 years of age were recruited. One parent or 
primary caregiver was also included in the study. Data collection occurred from April 2018 and 
continued until COVID-19 restrictions occurred in March 2020. Children in the ASD group 
required documentation of a diagnosis previously rendered by an external provider (e.g., primary 
care physician or psychologist) of ASD, autism, Asperger’s, or pervasive developmental disorder 
– not otherwise specified. Exclusion criteria for children in the TD group included having high 
scores on ASD screening measures, or a sibling with an ASD, autism, Asperger’s, or pervasive 
developmental disorder – not otherwise specified diagnosis. Exclusion criterion for children in 
both the TD and ASD group was having a standard score below 85 on the Verbal Cluster within 
the Early Years core battery of the Differential Ability Scales-II (DAS-II; Elliot, 2007). These 
exclusion criteria were established by the larger study. 
The current sample included N = 17 parent child dyads (ASD, n = 6; TD, n = 11). 
Children ranged in age from 3:3 to 6:11 and a majority of children were male. The primarily 
male sample of children who participated in this study is representative of the disproportionate 
representation of males with ASD in the general population (Loomes, Hull, & Mandy, 2017) but 
not representative of the general TD sample (U.S. Census, 2018). Most parents who participated 
in the study were female. The demographic characteristics between TD and ASD groups did not 
differ significantly except for verbal ability. Demographic characteristics of the sample 
population reveal participants were generally more well educated and had a higher household 
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income than compared to data of the U.S. population (U.S. Census, 2018). In addition, African 
American/Black, American Indian/Alaska Native, and Hispanic/Latinx were not adequately 
represented in the sample for the current study. Additional demographic information for parents 
and children is presented by group (ASD vs. TD) in Table 1.   
   
 
 
Table 1.     
Parent and Child Demographic Characteristics by Group 
Child Characteristics ASD TD t/χ2 Total 
N 6 11  17 
Average Age in Months (SD) 66.17 (11.97) 52.27 (13.79) -2.072 57.18 (14.51) 
Age Range in Months 49-83 39-81   
Sex, n (% male) 4 (66.67) 7 (63.63) .901 11 (64.71) 
Average Verbal Ability (SD) 101.33 (8.59) 118.18 (14.37) 2.607*  
Verbal Ability Range 93-112 102-149   
Child Race, n (%)     
     Caucasian/White 4 (66.67) 9 (81.82)  13 (76.47) 
     African American/ Black 0 (0) 0 (0)  0 (0) 
     Hispanic/Latinx 1 (16.67) 0 (0%)  1 (7.69) 
     Asia /Pacific Islander 0 (0%) 1 (9.09)  1 (7.69) 
     Multiracial/Other 1 (16.67) 1 (9.09)  2 (11.67) 
     
Parent Characteristics ASD TD  Total 
Sex, n (% female) 0 (0) 3 (27.27) .159 3 (17.65) 
Relationship Status, n (%)   .446  
     Married 6 (100) 10 (90.90)  16 (94.12) 
     Never Married/Single 0 (0) 1 (9.09)  1 (5.88) 
Reported Household Income      






     Missing Data, n (%) 1 (16.67) 2 (18.18)  3 (17.65) 
Education Level, n (%)     
     Some College Coursework 1 (16.67) 0 (0)  1 (7.69) 
     Bachelor’s Degree 2 (33.33) 2 (18.18)  4 (23.52) 
     Master’s Degree 2 (33.33) 7 (63.63)  9 (52.94) 
     Some Professional     
       Coursework 
1 (16.67) 0 (0)  1 (7.69) 
     Professional Degree 0 (0%) 2 (18.18%)  2 (11.67%) 
Note. *p<0.05     
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Procedures 
Recruitment. Participants were recruited locally through schools, hospitals, ASD 
treatment clinics, our social media page, posting boards, and ASD focused events. Participants 
were provided general information about the study via phone or email prior to scheduling an 
enrollment visit. During the enrollment visit, the child participant was verified that they met 
enrollment criteria, and a university visit was scheduled. 
 Enrollment visit. The enrollment occurred at a location of the family’s choosing (i.e., 
family home, library, or Study of Autism and Self-Regulation laboratory). Parent consent and 
child assent were obtained at the beginning of the enrollment visit. Children were administered a 
battery of measures including the verbal ability measure and the affect recognition measure. 
Parents responded on a demographics and health history questionnaire about their family that is 
part of a battery of questionnaires included in the larger study. The enrollment visit took 
approximately 70-120 minutes. Once it was verified that the child met the eligibility criteria for 
verbal ability, families were scheduled for the university visit. 
University visit. The university visits took approximately 120-240 minutes and were 
conducted at the Study of Autism and Self-Regulation laboratory. During the university visit, 
children were administered another battery of measures as part of the larger study, while parents 
participated in the meta-emotion interview. Families were given $50 in cash and a $5 coffee card 
for their participation in the study at the conclusion of the university visit. Children also received 
stickers, edible reinforcers, and a small toy for their participation in the study. This study was 
conducted in accordance with the procedures approved by the university Institutional Review 
Board.  
  
THEORY OF MIND IN CHILDREN WITH ASD 26 
 
Measures 
 Verbal ability. Verbal ability was measured using the Verbal Comprehension and 
Naming Vocabulary subtests from the Verbal Cluster of the Early Years Battery (ages 2:6-6:11) 
of the DAS-II. These subtests assess receptive and expressive language abilities, respectively.  
Correct responses were scored as “1,” and incorrect responses were scored “0”. The sum of the 
scores from the responses of a given item set were converted into an ability score, and then 
converted into T scores. The T scores of the Verbal Comprehension and Naming Vocabulary 
subtests were then summed and converted to a standard score. Participants were only eligible for 
the larger study if they obtained a standard score of 85 or greater. Verbal ability served as a 
control variable in later analyses. 
 The standardization sample of the DAS-II comprised of 3,480 individuals from the 
United States between the ages of 2:6 and 17:11 years of age. The internal consistency for the 
Verbal Cluster were found to be good, with coefficients between .86 and .93 (Elliot, 2007). The 
DAS-II has strong correlations with other measures of cognitive ability including the Weschler 
Intelligence Scales for Children Fourth Edition and the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence Fourth Edition which demonstrates concurrent validity (Elliot, 2007).  
Theory of mind (ToM). Participants’ ToM abilities were assessed using three different 
tasks. The first task assessed for recognition of diverse beliefs in others. The participant was 
shown a doll and a picture of a house and bushes. The participant was told that the cat is hiding 
in the house or the bushes and doll wants her cat. The participant was asked where they would 
look for the cat. The participant was told that the doll thinks the cat is in the location opposite to 
the child’s choice. The participant was asked where the doll would look for her cat. One point 
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was allotted for responding that the doll would look for her cat in the opposite location of what 
the participant stated. 
The second task assesses for recognition of self and others’ false beliefs. The participant 
was shown a tube labelled as chocolate. The participant was asked what they think is in the tube.  
The participant was then shown that the contents of the tube is crayons. The participant was 
asked what is inside the tube to confirm the participant comprehends the reality of the contents in 
the tube (crayons). The participant was also asked about what they initially thought was in the 
tube to ensure that the child accurately remembers their initial response (chocolate). The 
participant was told that a girl comes along and has not seen inside the tube and was asked what 
the girl will think is inside the tube (one point is assigned for responding “chocolate”). If the 
participant failed either the memory control or the reality test questions, the participant received 
a score of 0. If the participant correctly responds to the memory control and the reality control 
test questions in addition to the question about what the girl thinks in the tube, then a score of 1 
was assigned. The last question asks, how would the girl feel, if an emotion congruent response 
is provided (e.g., mad, sad, disappointed), the participant received an additional point. 
The last task administered assesses for others’ false beliefs in a situation of a changed 
location. The participant was shown two dolls named Sally and Anne. The participant was asked 
to correctly identify each of the dolls by name. Sally has a favorite teddy bear that the 
participants observe is placed into a basket for safekeeping before Sally leaves to go and play. 
While Sally was playing, the participants observed Anne move the teddy bear into a box. The 
participants were asked where Sally will look for the bear when she returns (a score of 1 is 
assigned for responses that indicate Sally would look for the teddy bear in the basket). To ensure 
accurate perception of reality and memory, the participants were also asked where the bear is 
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actually located and where it was located initially. The participants received a score of 0 if they 
do not answer these questions correctly (even though they may have correctly answered the 
question regarding where Sally would look for the bear). The last question asks, how would 
Sally feel, if an emotion congruent response is provided (e.g., mad, sad, disappointed), the 
participant received an additional point. The sum of scores from all three tasks (ranging from 0-
5) comprised each participant’s overall ToM score. Batteries of ToM tasks have been shown to 
have very high internal consistency (α = .98) for assessing both TD children and children with 
ASD (Hutchins, Prelock, & Bonazingga, 2012). Batteries of ToM measures also demonstrate 
criterion validity in that increases in scores are significantly correlated with increases in age (as it 
is well studied that the development of ToM occurs in early childhood and continues beyond late 
childhood; Hutchins et al., 2012). 
 Affect recognition. The ability to recognize facial expressions was measured using the 
Affect Recognition subtest of A Developmental Neuropsychological Assessment (NEPSY-II; 
Korkman, Kirk & Kemp, 2007). This subtest assesses the ability to recognize happy, sad, angry, 
fear, disgust, and neutral facial expressions from photographs of children’s faces in three 
different tasks. In one task, the participant was required to identify if two photographs depict 
faces with the same affect. In the next task, the participant selects two photographs of faces with 
the same affect from a selection of three to four photographs. In the last task, the participant 
selects one of four photographs of faces that matches the affect of a single photograph presented 
at the top of the page. Correct responses were scored as “1” and incorrect scores are scored as 
“0”. Scores are summed and then converted into a scaled score based on age norms. Errors were 
also counted by emotion (i.e., sad, angry, disgust, happy, neutral, fear). 
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 The nationally representative (based on the 2003 U.S. Census) standardization sample of 
the NEPSY-II comprised of 1,200 children ages 3:0 to 16:0 years. The internal consistency 
coefficients for children aged 3 to 6 years ranged from .64 to .80 for the affect recognition 
subtest. The affect recognition subtest has very low correlations with measures of intellectual 
functioning from the WISC-IV which provides evidence for discriminant validity.  
 Parent meta-emotion. Parent meta-emotion across all seven dimensions was assessed 
for using a semi-structured interview designed by Gottman, Katz, and Hooven (1996). This 
interview was audio recorded and took approximately 1 hour to complete with the parent of the 
child participant.  Parents verbally responded to the same set of questions for three emotions 
(i.e., sadness, fear, and anger) in their children. Parent’s verbal responses were ranked by coders 
according to the following Likert-type scale: strongly agree = 5, agree = 4, neutral = 3, disagree 
= 2, strongly disagree = 1, or don’t know = 0. An example of an item coded is “parent teaches 
rules for appropriate expression to the child.” Seven dimensions were assessed (a) parent’s 
awareness of their own emotion; (b) parent’s acceptance of their own emotion; (c) parent’s 
regulation of their own emotion; (d) parent’s awareness of their child’s emotion; (e) parent’s 
acceptance of their child’s emotion; (f) parent’s coaching of their child’s emotion; and (g) 
parent’s regulation of their child’s emotion. The number of items for each dimension ranged 
from 9-12 items. Total meta-emotion score and dimension scores across all three emotions were 
calculated using Gottman and colleague’s scoring Version A protocol. Higher scores indicated 
better emotion awareness, acceptance, regulation, or coaching by parents. At the end of the meta-
emotion interview, parents were asked if their child’s characteristics influence their meta-
emotion philosophies. The responses to the final question do not factor into the overall scores. 
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 The audio recordings were coded by a primary coder according to the meta-emotion 
coding system as outlined by Gottman and colleagues (1996). Reliability coding was conducted 
every five participants with a secondary coder to ensure a minimum agreement of 0.80 (Landis & 
Koch, 1977). Coder 1 and 2 met average interrater reliability of 0.84 across the reliability cases. 
This was comparable to original interrater reliabilities reported by Gottman and colleagues 
(1996) which ranged from 0.61 to 0.88 across the seven dimensions (i.e., parent awareness, 
parent acceptance, parent regulation of emotion, and awareness, acceptance, coaching, and 
regulation of their child’s emotion) comprising the total meta-emotion score. 
  




Data Entry and Preparation 
 Data were collected and entered into SPSS version 26.0 and analyzed using the 
PROCESS macro add-on (Hayes, 2012). Demographic variables entered were: (a) child verbal 
ability (continuous variable, entered as standard score); (b) child gender (dichotomous variable, 
female=0, male=1); (c) child chronological age (continuous variable, entered in months); (d) 
child race (categorical variable, White/Caucasian = 1, Black/African American = 2, 
Hispanic/Latinx = 3, Native American/Alaskan Native = 4, Asian/Pacific Islander = 5, Multi-
racial = 6); (e) parent relationship status (categorical variable, legally married/living with spouse 
= 1, separated = 2, divorced = 3, widowed = 4, never married/single = 5, unmarried/living with 
partner = 6; (f) parent education (categorical variable, less than high school degree = 1, high 
school degree = 2, some college coursework = 3, bachelor’s degree = 4, some master’s = 5, 
master’s degree = 6, some professional schooling beyond master’s = 7, completed professional 
degree = 8); (g) parent gender (dichotomous variable, female = 0, male = 1); (h) household 
income (continuous variable, entered in dollars). The independent variable, developmental status, 
was entered as a dichotomous variable (TD = 0, ASD = 1). The mediator, affect recognition, and 
moderator, parent meta-emotion, and dependent variable, ToM, were entered as continuous 
variables. 
Power Analyses 
 A priori analysis of power was conducted using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009), a statistical 
calculator software. The following six predictors were included in the power analysis: child’s 
developmental status, parent meta-emotion, child affect recognition, child gender, child age, and 
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verbal ability. Child gender, age, and verbal ability were control variables in this analysis. A 
Cohen’s effect size of 0.2 was entered into the calculator, as was consistent with large effect 
sizes from previous research (Rødgaard et al., 2019). The alpha level was entered as 0.05 and the 
power level as 0.80. Based on the criteria entered in the calculator, a sample size of 59 was 
required to achieve adequate power. The final sample used in the study was comprised of 17 
participants, which is below the sample size required to achieve adequate power (0.80). Due to 
the small sample size, ancillary analyses that were more appropriate for small sample sizes are 
included for this study following the planned analyses. 
Data Screening 
Prior to data analysis, data were screened for missingness and outliers. All data related to 
the independent, control, moderating, mediating, and dependent variables were determined to be 
complete. All demographic data were complete except for household salary (three parents opted 
out of responding to the household salary question). The data was screened for outliers through 
visual inspection of boxplots and verified by calculating Cooks Distance values. Inspection of 
boxplots and Cooks Distance greater than 1 revealed one outlier in the ASD group (Cooks 
Distance = 3.85) on total parent meta-emotion scores. The outlier was examined at an item level 
basis and both revealed consistently low scores across items on all three dimensions. This outlier 
was determined to be a score reflecting variability in the sample population and was included. 
No cases were identified as outliers on boxplots and no cases had a Cooks Distance greater than 
1 (Field, 2013) on affect recognition scores. Per recommendations by Hayes (2013), 
bootstrapping was used as method due to its resistance to outliers. 
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Assumptions of Multiple Regression 
 To conduct multiple regression analyses, the assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity, 
independence, normality, and multicollinearity must be examined for each continuous variable to 
ensure that they are not violated. Developmental status was a dichotomous variable, so the 
assumptions were analyzed by group, TD = 0 and ASD = 1. 
 Linearity. The assumption of linearity requires that a linear (and not a quadratic or 
cubic) relationship exists between predictor variables and the dependent variable. Data were 
graphed as scatterplots with best fitting lines and visually inspected by group, all data appeared 
linear. The residuals and predicted values of the data points of the outcome variable were 
graphed in a scatter plot and inspected. The data points were confirmed to be randomly and 
evenly dispersed around zero. The assumption of linearity was met. 
 Homoscedasticity. To verify that the data met the assumption of homoscedasticity, the 
variance of the residuals must be constant across all values of the independent variable (Field, 
2013). To ensure this, the data were visually examined and appeared evenly dispersed around the 
regression line without outliers on the graph of the partial plots. The assumption of 
homoscedasticity was met. 
 Independence. The assumption of independence requires residuals to be independent of 
one another. The Durbin-Watson test was employed to test the dependence between residuals, 
where values less than one or greater than three suggest residual dependence (Field, 2013). The 
Durbin-Watson value for the TD (Durbin-Watson value = 1.88) and ASD (Durbin-Watson value 
= 1.06) group fell between 1 and 3 which suggests residual independence, thus meeting the 
independence assumption. 
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 Normality. The assumption that there is the normal distribution of data was analyzed 
using visual examination of histograms and P-P plots. The histograms of residuals appeared to be 
distributed in a bell-shaped curve and the z-scores fell closely along the diagonal line on P-P 
plots. This indicated normal distribution of the data and thus, the assumption of normality was 
met. 
 Multicollinearity.  Predictors should not be strongly correlated with one another as it 
increases the difficulty to assess the influence of the predictor variables on the dependent 
variable (Field, 2013). Multicollinearity was examined during preliminary correlational analyses 




Preliminary analyses of correlations between variables were conducted to identify 
potential covariates related to the variables of interest (see Table 2). Covariates previously 
identified by research included child verbal ability, child age, and child gender (Adenzato et al., 
2017; Calero et al., 2014; Paynter & Peterson, 2010). These previously identified covariates were 
not correlated with the variables of interest and were not included as covariates in subsequent 
analyses. In examining Pearson’s bivariate correlations for the other study variables, child’s age 
was significantly correlated with children’s affect recognition scaled scores (r = .79, p < 0.01).  
Child age was controlled for in subsequent analyses. 
Table 2.  
Bivariate Correlations for Study Variables  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Status          
2. Age .47         
3. Child Gender .03 -.31        
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4. Verbal Ability -.56* .03 .05       
5. Affect Recognition -.26 .79** -.08 .16      
6. ToM Score -.25 .32 -.28 .37 .39     
7. Parent MEI Score -.22 -.19 -.31 -.18 -.13 -.18    
8. Household Income -.01 .13 -.20 -.26 -.06 .07 -.35   
9. Parent Gender -.34 -.19 .02 .164 -.01 .13 -.14 -.01  
Note. N = 17; Verbal Ability = Differential Ability Scale, Second Edition Verbal Ability 
standard score; Affect Recognition = A Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment, 
Second Edition Affect Recognition scaled score; ToM Score = Theory of Mind total score. 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Descriptive analyses (i.e., means, standard deviations, range, t-tests, and effect sizes) of 
the variables affect recognition, ToM, and MEI are presented in Table 3. No significant group 
differences (TD vs. ASD) were found for these variables. Children and their parents from the 
ASD and TD groups did not differ significantly in demographic characteristics except for 
average verbal ability (see Table 1). TD children had significantly higher average verbal ability 
than children with ASD (t = 2.607, p = 0.02). The effect size (d = 1.42) was large. This 
difference that children with ASD tend to score more poorly on measures of verbal ability, is 




Descriptive Statistics for Variables by Group 
Variable 
Status  











11, 19 12.64  
(4.61) 
6, 20 -1.03 .62 
ToM 2.33 
(1.75) 
1, 5 3.18 
(1.66) 
1, 5 .99 .50 
MEI 867.51 
(67.19) 
751.20, 950.42 892.54 
(48.54) 
781.13, 954.02 .86 .43 
Note.  ARS = A Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment, Second Edition Affect 
Recognition scaled score; ToM = Theory of Mind total score; MEI = Parent MEI total score. 
*p < .05 
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Test of Hypotheses 
 The PROCESS macro Model 7 in SPSS was used to conduct data analysis (Hayes, 2012; 
see Figure 2.). The associations between developmental status, parent emotion coaching, affect 
recognition, and ToM were examined in a piece meal manner.  
 
Figure 2. Statistical diagram of the moderating effect of parent emotion coaching on the 
mediation relationship of affect recognition between status and theory of mind. 
The first hypothesis stated children in the ASD group would have lower affect 
recognition scores than children in the TD group. This hypothesis was tested using hierarchical 
linear regression. Child age was correlated with affect recognition scores and was entered as a 
control variable in the first step. Child age significantly predicted affect recognition scores and 
accounted for 63% of the variance in the model, indicating that as the age of the child increased, 















Status x Parent Meta-Emotion 
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the independent variable with affect recognition as the dependent variable. Developmental status 
did not significantly predict children’s affect recognition scores, accounting for an additional 2% 
of the variance in the model. The hypothesis was not supported, developmental status did not 
predict affect recognition scores while controlling for child age.  F (2,15) = 12.76, p = 0.42, R2 = 
0.65, β = -0.15. See Table 4 for regression coefficients. 
Table 4. 
Hierarchical Regression: Affect Recognition Regressed on Developmental Status 
Variable B SE β R2 F ΔR2 
Step 1    0.63 25.37*  
Age 0.23 0.05 0.79    
       
Step 2    0.65 12.76 0.02 
Status -1.27 1.54 -0.15    
Note.  N = 17. Age = Child’s Age in Months; Status = Developmental Status (TD = 0, ASD = 
1). 
*p < .05 
 
The second hypothesis stated developmental status would have a negative relationship 
with ToM scores (children with ASD would have worse ToM performance than children with 
TD). This hypothesis was tested using regression. No control variables were identified for ToM 
scores in the bivariate correlation analyses (see Table 2), therefore, no control variables were 
entered. The hypothesis was not supported, developmental status did not predict ToM scores, F 
(1, 15) = 0.98. p = 0.34, β = -0.25, R2 = 0.06. 
The third hypothesis stated higher parent meta-emotion scores would buffer the effect of 
developmental status on affect recognition scores (see Figure 3). This was assessed using the 
PROCESS macro, model 7 in SPSS (Hayes, 2013). ToM was entered as the dependent variable, 
affect recognition was entered as the mediator, and developmental status was entered as the 
independent variable. Parent meta-emotion was entered as the moderator. Child age was entered 
as a covariate. Bootstrapping using 5,000 samples was used to estimate the confident intervals 
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for the interaction effect. The hypothesis was not supported, the interaction was not significant, 
parent meta-emotion scores did not buffer the effect of developmental status on affect 
recognition scores while controlling for child age, B = 0.0008, SE = 0.03, CI95 = -0.06 to 0.06, R
2 
= 0.65, ΔR2 = 0.00. See Table 5 for regression coefficients. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Statistical diagram of the moderating effect of parent meta-emotion on the relationship 
between developmental status and affect recognition. 
The fourth hypothesis stated the indirect effect of developmental status on ToM scores 
would occur through affect recognition scores (see Figure 4). PROCESS macro, model 4 was 
used to test this hypothesis as model 7 does not give the total effect. The hypothesis was not 
supported, there was no significant indirect effect of developmental status on ToM scores 
through affect recognition, B = -0.60, CI95 = -1.58 to 0.36, R
2 = 0.17. See table 5 for regression 
coefficients. 
b3 = 0.0008 
b1 = -2.03 
Status 
(TD vs. ASD) 
Parent Meta-
Emotion 






b2 = -0.0006 
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Figure 4.  Statistical diagram of the mediating effect of affect recognition on the relationship 
between developmental status and theory of mind 
Table 5. 
Regressions of Affect Recognition, Theory of Mind, and Developmental Status 
Predictor Outcome B SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Status (a path) ARS -1.28 1.54 -0.83 0.42 -4.57 2.02 
ARS (b path) ToM 0.003 0.08 0.04 0.97 -0.17 0.18 
Status (c path) ToM -0.60 0.45 -1.34 0.20 -1.58 0.36 
Status (c’ path) ToM -0.60 0.48 -1.26 0.23 -1.64 0.44 
        
Indirect Effect of Developmental Status on Theory of Mind Through Affect Recognition 
 Mediator Effect Boot SE BootLLCI BootULCI 
 ARS -0.004 0.19 -0.38 0.35 
      
Note.  N = 17. ARS = A Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment, Second Edition 
Affect Recognition scaled score; Age = Child’s Age in Months; Status = Developmental Status 
(TD = 0, ASD = 1); ToM = Theory of Mind total score. 
*indicates significant confidence intervals 
 
The fifth hypothesis stated the indirect effect of developmental status on ToM scores, 
through affect recognition scores would be moderated by parent-meta emotion on the ‘a path’ 
(see Figure 4). This hypothesis was not supported, the conditional indirect effect was not 
significant, indicated by the bootstrapped confidence intervals crossing zero and the index of 
moderated mediation (B = 0.00, CI95 = -0.01 to 0.01). 
ai = -1.28 bi  = 0.003 
c’ = -0.60 
1 
Status 
(TD vs. ASD) 





THEORY OF MIND IN CHILDREN WITH ASD 40 
 
Table 6. 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Developmental Status on Theory of Mind through Affect 
Recognition, by Parent Meta-Emotion 
Predictor Outcome B SE t p LLCI ULCI 
Status ARS -2.03 24.32 -0.08 0.93 -55.04 50.98 
MEI ARS -0.006 0.02 -0.03 0.98 -0.04 0.04 
Status x MEI ARS 0.0008 0.03 0.03 0.98 -0.06 0.06 
Age ARS 0.25 0.06 4.21 0.001 0.12* 0.38* 
        
Status ToM -0.60 0.48 -1.26 0.23 -1.64 0.44 
ARS ToM 0.003 0.08 0.04 0.97 -0.17 0.18 
Age ToM 0.02 0.03 0.90 0.38 -0.03 0.08 
        
Conditional Indirect Effects of Parent Meta-Emotion on the Relation of Status to Theory of 
Mind 
 MEI Effect Boot SE BootLLCI BootULCI Index 
ARS 818.10 -0.004 2.24 -0.95 1.28  
ARS 888.94 -0.004 1.30 -0.55 0.57  
ARS 938.72 -0.004 3.72 -0.85 0.56  
       
Index of Moderated Mediation      
   0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
Note.  N = 17. ARS = A Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment, Second Edition 
Affect Recognition scaled score; Age = Child’s Age in Months; Status = Developmental Status 
(TD = 0, ASD = 1); ToM = Theory of Mind total score; MEI = Parent MEI total score. 
*indicates significant confidence intervals 
 
Ancillary Analyses 
 In response to the small sample size obtained in this study, ancillary analyses using 
methods more appropriate for small sample sizes were included. Methods of analyses suitable for 
small sample sizes including t-tests, Chi square tests, and thematic analyses were used to further 
understand the data. Although the initial analyses did not reveal significant relations between 
developmental status and affect recognition scores or mean ToM scores, ancillary analyses were 
used to identify any group differences in ToM responses, affect recognition errors, and parent 
meta-emotion at the dimension level. In addition, ancillary analyses were used to clarify the 
relation between parent-meta emotion at the dimension level and affect recognition errors. 
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Theory of Mind  
 First, children’s ToM abilities were further evaluated by task (see Figure 5). All children 
who participated in the study passed the diverse beliefs task. Of the 17 children who passed the 
diverse beliefs task, only 10 children passed the self and other false beliefs task. Within the 10 
children who passed the self and other false beliefs task, only seven children responded with an 
emotion congruent response. Of the 10 children who passed the self and other false beliefs task, 
seven children passed the changed location false beliefs task. Within the seven children who 
passed the changed location false beliefs task, six children responded with an emotion congruent 
response.  
 
Figure 5. Diagram of total participants and pass/fail at each level of the theory of mind tasks.  
When children’s ToM abilities were further evaluated by task and grouped by 
developmental status (see Figure 6), similar patterns emerged. For children in the TD group, all 
children passed the diverse beliefs task, but fewer children passed the changed location false 
beliefs task, than the self and other false beliefs task. For the five children in the TD group who 
passed both the self and other false beliefs and changed location false belief task, the average age 
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was 57.8 months. Additionally, three of these five children were above the age of 48 months 
which has been identified as the average age of understanding diverse false beliefs. Four of these 
five children also passed the emotion congruence question. Using visual inspection, no patterns 
about verbal ability and affect recognition scores were identified for those who passed all three 
ToM tasks. 
For children in the ASD group, all six children passed the diverse beliefs task but only 
two participants were able to pass the self and other false beliefs task and the changed location 
false beliefs task. The two children with ASD who were able to pass both the self and other false 
beliefs and changed location false belief task were above the age of 48 months (M = 78) and 
were the oldest children in the ASD group. They also had the highest verbal ability scores (i.e., 
scores of 107 and 108) and the highest affect recognition scores in the ASD group (i.e., scores of 
19 and 16), and were only two in the ASD group  to pass the emotion congruence question.  
 
Figure 6. Diagram of participants pass/fail at each level of the theory of mind tasks organized by 
developmental status (TD vs. ASD).  
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Table 7.   
Mean Characteristics of Children who Passed Each ToM Task 
 Developmental Status 










Diverse Beliefs Task 52.27 118.18 14.83 66.17 101.33 12.64 
Self and Other False Beliefs Task 78.00 107.50 17.50 55.38 120.63 13.38 
Changed Location False Beliefs 
Task 
78.00 107.50 17.50 57.80 121.00 14.40 
Note.  ARS = A Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment, Second Edition Affect 
Recognition scaled score; Verbal Ability=Differential Ability Scales, Second Edition Verbal 
Ability standard score. 
 
Emotion Recognition and Meta-emotion 
 First, affect recognition abilities were further investigated by testing for group differences 
in affect recognition errors by status using independent t-tests. No significant differences in 
affect recognition errors were found between TD children and children with ASD. Next, 
developmental status group differences in parent meta-emotion at the dimension level were 
examined using independent t-tests. No significant differences between parents of TD or ASD 
children were found across the seven-dimension scores of parent meta-emotion.   
 Second, the relations between affect recognition errors and parent meta-emotion by 
dimension were examined using correlations (see Table 8). Affect recognition errors for sadness 
were significantly related to parent meta-emotion dimension of child regulation of sadness (r = -
0.632, p = 0.007). Affect recognition errors for fear and anger were not significantly related to 
parent meta-emotion dimensions for fear and anger, respectively. Total affect recognition errors 
were significantly related to child regulation across all emotions (r = -.516, p = 0.034). 
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Table 8.  
 Correlations Between Affect Recognition Errors and Meta-Emotion Scores 
 Parent Meta-Emotion Dimensions for Sadness 
 Pawa Pacc Preg Cawa Cacc Ccoa Creg 
AR Sad Errors -.17 -.20 -.36 -.18 -.01 -.01 -.63** 
        
 Parent Meta-Emotion Dimensions for Fear 
 Pawa Pacc Preg Cawa Cacc Ccoa Creg 
AR Fear Errors -.21 .21 .20 .29 .03 .30 -.28 
        
 Parent Meta-Emotion Dimensions for Anger 
 Pawa Pacc Preg Cawa Cacc Ccoa Creg 
AR Anger Errors -.19 -.20 .20 -.20 .17 .09 -.39 
        
 Overall Parent Meta-Emotion Dimensions 
 Pawa Pacc Preg Cawa Cacc Ccoa Creg 
AR Total Errors .09 -.19 -.21 -.20 -.17 -.06 -.52* 
Note. N = 17; AR Errors = number of recognizing sadness on Developmental 
NEuroPSYchologyical Assessment, Second Edition (by emotion: sadness, fear, anger, and 
total); Pawa = parent awareness; Pacc = parent acceptance; Preg = parent regulation; Cawa = 
awareness of child; Cacc = acceptance of child; Ccoa = coaching of child; and Creg = 
regulation of child (by emotion: sadness, fear, anger, and overall). 
 
Thematic Analysis  
Due to the small sample size of the current study, thematic analysis was used to explore 
any potential differences between parents of TD children and parents of children with ASD 
based on the final question asked during the meta-emotion interview. The final question asked if 
parents believed their child’s characteristics influenced their meta-emotion philosophies. One 
parent was not asked the final question during the interview so the sample size for the thematic 
analysis was comprised of 16 participants (6 ASD and 10 TD). 
Thematic analysis is a method used to identify, organize, and explore patterns of meaning 
called ‘themes’ in data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is a qualitative approach that 
is flexible in nature and can provide rich and complex insights into data (Braun & Clarke). The 
method of thematic analysis was theoretical (i.e., driven by interest in identifying whether 
differences in meta-emotion philosophies existed between parents of TD children and parents of 
THEORY OF MIND IN CHILDREN WITH ASD 45 
 
children with ASD) and conducted based on the steps outlined by Braun and Clarke. The phases 
outlined included: 1) familiarization with the data including transcription of verbal data, 2) 
generation of initial codes, 3) searching for themes, and 4) reviewing themes.  
In this study, responses were listened to and transcribed from audio clips. Then responses 
were read and re-read for codes regarding child characteristics influencing meta-emotion 
philosophies. Responses were coded into two groups, the first group contained responses which 
affirmed that their child had characteristics that affected their meta-emotion philosophies, and 
the second group contained responses which denied that their child had characteristics that 
affected their meta-emotion philosophies. Affirmative responses were coded as such when 
parents either explicitly stated affirmation (e.g., “yes”) and/or if they described the 
characteristics of their child that influenced their meta-emotion philosophy. Responses that 
denied that their child’s characteristics influenced their meta-emotion philosophy included 
explicitly stated denials (e.g., “no”) or explicitly stated denials in the presence of descriptions of 
their child’s unique characteristics. The transcript extracts for the coded data were collated in a 
large table and read together to ensure the categorizations accurately reflected the meanings in 
the whole responses. During the re-reading, one parent of a TD child identified being unsure if 
their child’s characteristics influenced their meta-emotion philosophy and described some 
characteristics of their child. This response did not fit into the previously identified codes based 
on the themes of affirmative or denying responses. 
During thematic analysis, another sub-theme was identified, that when affirming that 
their child’s characteristics influenced their meta-emotion, parents varied in their evaluation of 
their child’s characteristics. Therefore, affirmative responses were further organized into three 
themes. The first group comprised parents who affirmed that their child’s characteristics 
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influenced their meta-emotion philosophy and viewed the characteristics as being related to 
difficulties (examples of responses in this group included mentions of increased difficulties 
helping their child regulate their emotions). The second group comprised parents who affirmed 
that their child’s characteristics influenced their meta-emotion philosophy but had a neutral 
evaluation of these characteristics. For example, some parents endorsed that their child’s 
characteristics influence their meta-emotion philosophies but had neutral evaluations of those 
characteristics or balanced both negative and positive evaluations of those characteristics. The 
last group comprised of parents who affirmed that their child’s characteristics influenced their 
meta-emotion philosophy and viewed the characteristics as being related to more ease in 
socializing their child about emotions. For example, some parents commented about their child 
being empathetic and easily self-regulating. These responses were then categorized further by 
developmental status (see Tables 9 and 10). 
Table 9.   
Thematic Grouping of Parents’ Responses 
 Developmental Status 
 TD (n=10) ASD (n=6) 
Yes 8 5 
No/Unsure 2 1 
Note. N=16; Yes=responses affirming that child characteristics influence parent’s meta-
emotion philosophies; No/Unsure=responses denying or unsure that child characteristics 
influence parents’ meta-emotions. 
 
Data regarding child’s developmental status (0=TD, 1=ASD) and parent response 
(0=no/unsure, 1=affirmative response) were entered into SPSS. A 2x2 Chi-square analysis was 
used to examine the relation between developmental status and parent response. Differences in 
parent response was not related to developmental status, χ2 = 0.027, p = 0.87, ϕ=0.041. A 2x3 
Chi-square analysis of the affirmative responses depending on developmental status was not 
appropriate due to the small sample size, violating the assumption that 20% of expected 
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frequencies in cells should be five or greater in Chi-square analysis with tables greater than 2x2 
(Green & Salkind, 2016). 
Based on the results from the previous ancillary analyses, no differences were expected 
between the TD and ASD groups. However, in examining parents’ responses by words used, 
parents in the two groups appeared to use different kinds of words used to describe their 
children. Examples of phrases used to describe children’s characteristics by parents in the TD 
group included: “emotionally regulated,” “empathetic,” “easygoing,” “assertive,” “compliant and 
lovely,” and “endearing.” Phrases parents in the ASD group used to describe their children 
included: “less expressive,” “non-verbal,” “hard to figure out,” “needing to be in control,” “need 
extra support.” 
  
Table 10.   
Further Thematic Grouping of Only Affirmative Responses Parents’ 
 Developmental Status 
 TD (n=10) ASD (n=6) 
Yes (more difficulties) 0 5 
Yes (neutral) 4 0 
Yes (ease) 4 0 
Note. N=13; Yes=responses affirming that child characteristics influence parent’s meta-
emotion philosophies; No=responses denying or unsure that child characteristics influence 
parents’ meta-emotions. 
 




 The current study was designed to investigate the relations between parents’ thoughts, 
beliefs, and interactions with their own emotions and their child’s emotions (i.e., parent meta-
emotion), children’s affect recognition abilities, and ToM abilities in children with ASD and TD 
children. This was conducted in a piece-meal manner to examine if differences existed based on 
the child’s developmental status. The final sample comprised of six children with ASD and 11 
typically developing children and one of their parents. The initial planned analyses of moderated 
mediation were underpowered due to the small sample size. As a result, ancillary analyses were 
conducted with methods of analyses more appropriate for small sample sizes to further examine 
the data. Discussion of results from analyses and ancillary analyses are provided in the following 
sections. Strengths and limitations of the current study and future directions for research will also 
be reviewed. 
Interpretation of Results  
Autism and affect recognition abilities. Results from the current study demonstrated 
that there was no relation between developmental status and scaled scores on the affect 
recognition task while controlling for child age. Results from ancillary analyses also found no 
significant difference in average number of affect recognition errors made between children in 
the TD and ASD groups. Therefore, the hypothesis that children with ASD would have worse 
affect recognition abilities was not supported. This hypothesis is not consistent with previous 
research finding differences in affect recognition performance (Lozier et al., 2014). A possible 
explanation for finding no significant differences between groups is due to the sample being 
comprised of children in the ASD group with average verbal abilities. This explanation is 
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supported by results from research demonstrating no differences in affect recognition scores on 
the NEPSY-II task for children with ASD with average or above average intellectual quotients 
(Barron-Linnankoski et al., 2015). Results indicated that age was a significant predictor of affect 
recognition scores, as the age of the child increased by one month, affect recognition scores 
increased by 0.79 scaled score. The average age of children who participated in the study was 
57.18 months (SD = 14.51), which suggests that potential differences between younger TD 
children and children and ASD (especially children with ASD and accompanying intellectual 
impairment) were not represented in the data. Although no differences in affect recognition 
abilities were found for children with ASD compared to TD children in the current study, it may 
still be possible that children with ASD have worse affect recognition abilities than children with 
TD in the broader population. 
Autism and ToM abilities. Results from the primary analyses demonstrated no 
statistically significant difference between mean ToM scores of children in the ASD and TD 
group. The hypothesis that children in the ASD group would have lower ToM scores than 
children in the TD group was not supported. Results also showed affect recognition scores were 
not correlated with ToM scores. Additionally, expected covariates of child age, verbal ability, 
and gender were not correlated with ToM abilities. These statistically non-significant findings 
are likely a result of the analyses being underpowered due to the small sample size. 
However, interesting trends emerged during the ancillary analyses of the data collected. 
During these analyses, ToM performance by task (i.e., diverse beliefs task, self and other false 
beliefs task, and changed location false beliefs task) was examined. Results demonstrated a trend 
of increasing difficulty across the three tasks (i.e., fewer children passing each subsequent task, 
17 children, 10 children, and 7 children). This finding is consistent with previous research 
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identifying a stepwise developmental progression through diverse desires, diverse true beliefs, 
false beliefs, to achieving understanding diverse emotions across the preschool years for TD 
children (Duh et al., 2016; Perner et al., 1987; Weismann et al., 2017; Wellman et al., 2001). 
Results also demonstrated that all children in the current study passed the first diverse beliefs 
task. This is consistent with previous research that TD children achieve understanding of diverse 
true beliefs by 3 years of age, given that all children in the current study were between 3 years 
and 3 months of age and 6 years and 11 months of age (Perner et al., 1987; Wellman et al., 
2001). Fewer children passed the last two ToM tasks which is also consistent with the average 
age of participants in the study being nearly 6 years of age. This is supported by previous 
research identifying that TD children begin to understand differing false beliefs and differing 
emotions between age 4 and 6 years (Duh et al., 2016; Wiesmann et al., 2017). However, given 
the cross-sectional methodology used of this study, conclusions about delays in onset or 
normative development over time of ToM abilities could not be drawn. 
Then, ToM performance for each task was examined by developmental status (i.e., TD 
vs. ASD). The performance of TD children across the three tasks followed a similar pattern of 
fewer and fewer children passing each subsequent task. For children with ASD, although all five 
children passed the first task, only two children passed the self and other false beliefs and 
changed location false belief task. Most interestingly, the two children with ASD who passed the 
last two tasks were the oldest children, had the highest verbal ability scores, and the highest 
affect recognition scores in the ASD group. Such a pattern was not evident with the TD group. 
This provides preliminary evidence of potential relations among developmental status, affect 
recognition, ToM, verbal ability, and age which is consistent with prior research identifying 
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poorer ToM performance for children with ASD with increased ToM performance predicted by 
greater verbal ability and age (Calero et al., 2013; Devine & Hughes, 2012; Pino et al., 2017). 
Autism and parent meta-emotion. The initial hypothesis that higher scores on parent 
meta-emotion would buffer against the effect of developmental status on affect recognition 
scores, while controlling for child age, was not supported. Also, no significant differences in 
parent meta-emotion overall scores or by dimension scores were found between parents of 
children with TD and with ASD. These findings are inconsistent with prior research suggesting 
that parents of children with developmental disabilities have differing experiences of emotion 
socialization compared to parents of TD children (Paterson et al., 2012). 
Further, when ancillary analyses were conducted to examine parent meta-emotion 
qualitatively at the response level, differences were identified between responses by parents of 
children with TD and parents of children with ASD. Overall, a majority (81%) of parents of TD 
children and children with ASD provided responses that affirmed their child’s characteristics 
influenced their meta-emotion philosophies. The number of parents who either affirmed that 
their child’s characteristics influenced their meta-emotion philosophies or denied/were unsure 
that their child’s characteristics influenced their meta-emotion philosophies did not differ by 
developmental status. Most interestingly, when affirmative responses were further examined, 
parents of TD children were more likely to identify that their child’s characteristics influenced 
their meta-emotion philosophies in a neutral manner or made their experiences of emotion 
socialization easier. In contrast, parents of children with ASD who had affirmative responses, 
were more likely to describe their child’s characteristics as making emotion socialization more 
difficult. Additionally, the language that parents of children with ASD used to describe their 
children’s characteristics (e.g., “less expressive,” “non-verbal,” “hard to figure out”) differed 
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from the language that parents of TD children used (e.g., “empathetic,” “easygoing,” “compliant 
and lovely”). This thematic analysis of the response level data from the parent meta-emotion 
interview supports previous research that parents of children with developmental disabilities 
have a different experience of emotion socialization than parents of children with TD (Paterson 
et al., 2012). Further longitudinal research should be conducted about parent meta-emotion to 
account for factors including potentially evolving parent meta-emotion philosophies since 
becoming a parent or becoming a parent of a child with a disability. In examining type of 
language used by parents to describe their children with ASD, further research should more 
closely examine the potential relation between parent meta-emotion philosophies and parent 
stress. Overall, findings from this study provide support for continued research of parents’ meta-
emotion philosophies and their influence on emotion socialization for children with and without 
ASD.  
 Parent meta-emotion and affect recognition abilities. Although no significant relation 
between overall parent meta-emotion and affect recognition scores was identified through the 
main analyses, ancillary analyses provided more information about these relations. Ancillary 
analyses provided evidence of the relation between parent meta-emotion and errors made in the 
affect recognition. Overall affect recognition errors were significantly and negatively related to 
overall child regulation parent meta-emotion dimension scores. These findings indicate that more 
adaptive parent meta-emotion philosophies about how their child regulates their emotions, 
parents’ roles in helping their children regulate emotions predicted fewer mistakes on affect 
recognition. This is consistent with previous research identifying that parents’ meta-emotion 
positively predicted TD children’s affect recognition skills (Castro et al., 2015). 
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When parent meta-emotion was examined at the dimension level (e.g., child awareness, 
child regulation, parent awareness etc.) by emotion (i.e., sadness, anger, fear) and affect 
recognition errors by emotion (i.e., sadness, fear, anger) significant relations were identified. 
Specifically, a significant negative relation was found between errors on sadness on the affect 
recognition task and parent meta-emotion score on the child regulation dimension for sadness. 
However, no significant relations were found between fear or anger errors and the parent meta-
emotion dimension of child regulation for fear or anger respectively. Initially, I hypothesized 
relations between emotion specific parent meta-emotion scores and corresponding affect 
recognition errors across all three emotions. This is interesting given that much of previous 
research have consistently found emotion specific affect recognition deficits across many 
negative emotions including anger, disgust, sadness and fear in children with ASD with below 
average verbal intelligence quotients (Lozier et al., 2014; Wingenbach, et al., 2016). However, 
only one previous study found sadness recognition specific deficits in adolescents with ASD 
with above average verbal intelligence quotients (Wallace et al., 2012). Considering that the 
sample in the current study was comprised of those with average verbal abilities, this may 
provide support that children with ASD and average verbal abilities may have differing affect 
recognition abilities for sadness over other emotions. Further, meta-analyses of research on 
prevalence of depression in individuals with high functioning ASD suggest they may experience 
higher prevalence rates than the general population (Wigham et al., 2017). Some research even 
suggests a negative relationship between ToM and self-esteem and depressive symptoms 
(McCauley et al., 2017). This highlights the importance of further research to elucidate these 
emotion specific relations between parent meta-emotion, affect recognition abilities, and ToM 
abilities.   
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Strengths and Limitations 
 This study had several strengths, specifically with methodology used. A strength in this 
study was allowing both fathers and mothers to participate in the study which improves on 
previous methodology which tended to focus on mothers’ meta-emotion. This study also utilized 
measures and methodology that allowed for both qualitative and quantitative methodology to 
provide a richer picture of children’s skills and relations with parent meta-emotion philosophy.  
There are several notable limitations to the current study. Sample restriction was evident 
in the current sample of children. This sample was restricted in terms of children’s verbal ability 
due to the inclusion criteria of the larger study (i.e., average or above DAS-II verbal ability 
score). Results showed the mean verbal ability standard score was 112. This is important to 
consider due to the predictive role of verbal abilities in ToM performance for TD pre-school 
aged children and children with ASD (Milligan et al., 2007). This suggests the study sample was 
comprised of children with above average ToM abilities. 
This sample was also restricted in terms of age. In post-hoc analysis of the data, 65% of 
the children who enrolled in the study were above the age of 4 years. As previously reviewed, by 
age 4, children with TD achieve differentiation of false differing beliefs and understandings in 
others and begin to anticipate actions of others (Wiesmann et al, 2017). This suggests the current 
study had a larger proportion of children who already had achieved this skill and, therefore, I was 
not able to capture the variation in younger children in the process of developing this skill. This 
may also explain why the expected covariate of child age was not significant in predicting ToM. 
Another limitation to the current study is the small sample size, leading to underpowered 
primary analyses. Lack of power increases the risk of type II error, particularly when smaller 
effect sizes are found (e.g., relation between status and affect recognition, R2 = 0.02, indirect 
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effect of status on ToM through affect recognition R2 = 0.17). Larger samples would increase 
power in detecting these effects. 
To account for these factors, future recruitment should be focused on a larger, more 
representative sample of child age and verbal ability. Researchers may also consider including 2-
year-old children in future studies to further elucidate the onset of development of ToM abilities, 
particularly for the diverse beliefs task. Ideally, future studies should use longitudinal 
methodology and a larger, more comprehensive battery of ToM tasks that includes more 
advanced ToM tasks (e.g., affective perspective taking tasks). These tasks are suitable for older 
pre-school aged children and children with higher verbal abilities. This is important because 
previous research suggests continued ToM development past the preschool years (Calero et al., 
2013; Devin & Hughes, 2012). 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
Future research should further elucidate whether parents’ awareness of their emotions 
and the emotions of their children captured by semi-structured meta-emotion interview is related 
to objective measures of parents’ emotion recognition abilities. This is especially important 
because recent research provides evidence that parents of children with ASD have worse 
emotion recognition abilities of sadness, disgust, and fear on direct objective measures compared 
to parents of TD children (Hu et al., 2018). Further, Hu et al. (2018) found that emotion 
recognition abilities in parents of children with ASD was negatively related to the severity of 
restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of behavior for their children. 
Although the current study included memory and understanding checks in the ToM 
battery, recent studies strongly suggest executive functions are a factor in predicting ToM 
performance for TD children and children with ASD (Duh et al., 2016; Sivaratnam et al., 2018). 
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This is especially important given that executive functions have been implicated specifically as a 
factor in the early development of ToM during the preschool aged years but not in later 
childhood (Devine et al., 2016; Pellicano, 2010). Further, it is important to control for the role of 
executive function in ToM development when assessing children with ASD, because research 
suggests these executive function deficits are associated with attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder symptoms rather than the core characteristics of ASD (Jones et al., 2018). Future studies 
may also improve on the methodology by including an explicit measure of working memory as a 
control variable. Future research may also consider using a larger battery of ToM tasks to capture 
a wider range of abilities present in preschool aged children with ASD. Given that previous 
research on ToM abilities in children with ASD have used a wide variety of ToM tasks and 
batteries (Rødgaard et al., 2019), comparing results from different studies is challenging. To 
increase comparability of results, future studies may consider using a ToM battery that has 
norms for TD children and children with ASD, such as the ToM battery in the NEPSY-II 
measure (Korkman et al., 2007). 
In summary, although the primary analyses were not significant, the ancillary analyses 
found significant relations and relevant patterns. The current study found a significant positive 
relation between parents’ meta-emotion philosophies about their child’s emotion regulation and 
affect recognition accuracy, trends suggestive of differences in ToM abilities in children with 
ASD, and patterns indicating differences in the experiences of parents in emotion socialization of 
children with ASD from parents with TD children. This research provides important groundwork 
and rationale for continued research to elucidate the relations among ASD, parent meta-emotion 
philosophies, affect recognition abilities, and ToM abilities. Further examination of these 
THEORY OF MIND IN CHILDREN WITH ASD 57 
 
relations may potentially provide crucial avenues for intervention through parent involvement as 
well as direct child intervention and provide support for additional research in this area. 
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